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Abstract 
 
 
This paper deals with the impact of power on tactical action in conflict. The theory and research 
is organized around two conceptual distinctions: one between power based on dependence versus 
punitive capability, and the other between relative power (i.e., power difference) and "total 
power" in a relationship (i.e., across actors). The paper will argue that these distinctions are 
important on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, they are important to 
explicate the connection between conceptions of power that stress the coercive foundation of 
power (Bierstedt 1950; Tedeschi, Schlenker & Bonoma 1973) and those that treat power as 
dependence (Bacharach & Lawler 1981; Cook & Emerson 1984; Cook et al. 1981; Emerson 
1962, 1972a, 1972b; Molm 1985), as well as to understand the relation of power to tactical 
action. Empirically, these distinctions are important to the degree that different tactics available 
to actors are a function of disparate facets of the power relationship. 
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This paper tests several propositions specifying the impact of dependence and punitive 
capability on concession and coercive tactics in bargaining. Power is defined as a potential to 
influence which can take the form of either dependence or punitive (i.e., coercive) capability 
(Bacha- rach & Lawler 1980,1981,1986; Bierstedt 1950; Emerson 1962,1972a, 1972b; Kipnis 
1974; Lawler & Bacharach 1986; Molm 1985; Tedeschi, Schlenker & Bonoma 1973; Wilier and 
Anderson 1981). Relative power refers to the difference in either dependence or punitive 
capability between two or more actors; while "total power" refers to the amount of power 
potential available to actors in a relationship (i.e., the sum of the power capability across actors 
in the relation).1 The contrast of relative and total power can apply to either the dependence or 
punitive foundation of power, and the question is: Are the effects of relative and total power 
similar for both dependence and punitive foundations of power? 
Tactical action refers to behavior that is intended to influence another actor (Bacharach & 
Lawler 1980; Kipnis 1974; Michener & Suchner 1972). Such action typically falls into one of 
two categories: action that promises to or actually provides some benefit to the other (e.g., 
concession tactics in bargaining) or action that threatens to or actually levies some cost on the 
other (e.g., damage or punishment tactics). This paper will utilize an artificial bargaining context 
to test theories that predict concession and damage tactics from the power relationship. 
The theory and research in this paper is grounded in criticisms of previous work on 
power that fall into two classes: problems of theory and problems of emphasis. The theoretical 
problems stem from the neglect of some important distinctions. First of all, while both 
dependence and punitive capability are foundations of power, this does not necessarily suggest 
that theoretical principles or research findings which apply to one of these forms of power apply 
to the other. The distinction is essentially a difference between opportunity costs and retaliation 
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costs. Power-dependence theory stipulates that the power of A over B is a function of the value B 
places on the outcomes received in the relationship with A and level of these (or substitutable) 
outcomes that can be gotten from other actors (Emerson 1962, 1972a, 1972b). The level of 
alternatives (weighted by the value) constitute the opportunity costs of staying in the relationship 
with A (Bacharach & Lawler 1980, 1981). On the other hand, the punitive form of power is 
based on the "retaliation" costs that one actor can levy on the other, that is, the ability to 
administer additional costs beyond simply withdrawing some existing benefit supplied to the 
other. On both theoretical and empirical grounds, there are good reasons for distinguishing 
opportunity from retaliation costs and, hence, the relevant forms of power. 
As an example, assume that two actors in a bargaining relation have both (a) alternative 
actors from whom they might negotiate some level of payoff and (b) the capacity to add costs 
beyond those involved in breaking off negotiations. These additional costs could be the costs of a 
strike to management, of military action or economic sanctions levied by one nation against 
another, etc. The power they have over each other is not just based on the difference between 
their alternative outcome sources (weighted by the value) but also on how much retaliation each 
can or will suffer if they do not make sufficient concessions in the bargaining or decide to opt for 
the alternative. Opting for the alternative would have not only opportunity costs (i.e., what can 
be gotten by staying in the negotiations) but also retaliation costs based on the punishment that 
can be levied in response to bargaining tough or breaking off negotiations and going elsewhere. 
It is quite possible to subsume and fuse these costs under a power dependence 
framework. Emerson (1972) does this as do Bacharach and Lawler (1980) in their reformulation 
of Emerson. However, while it is dear that punitive forms of power can be subsumed under 
power dependence, it is not clear whether this is an advisable .theoretical stance. If the same 
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prindples do not apply to dependence and punitive forms of power or the distinction has 
important empirical consequences, power dependence theory will not provide information or 
explanations that are applicable to contexts where the principal form of power available to actors 
is punitive in nature. 
The second theoretical problem is the failure of most work on power to consider the 
distinction between relative power and total power (for a few exceptions, see Kanter 1977; 
Tannenbaum 1968). Much of the literature on power and tactics confounds relative and total 
power (c.f. Homstein 1965; Lawler 1986; Rubin & Brown 1975) such that the effects of power 
can be attributed to either or both the power difference or the total power in the social 
relationship. To illustrate this, assume that the magnitude of political power for each actor 
(whether based on dependence or punitive capability) can range from 1 unit to 100 units, and that 
the power difference between the actors is 30. A power difference of 30 could mean that one 
actor has 40 units of power (i.e., based on dependence or punitive capability) while the other has 
10 or that one actor has 90 while the other has 60, or 50 vs. 20, etc. The relative power is 
constant across these two situations, but the total power in the relationship differs (i.e., "50" vs. 
"150"). Conversely, relative power could vary across situations with total power remaining 
constant (e.g., 30 vs. 20, 45 vs. 5, etc.). The point is that relative and total power can vary 
independently of one another (see Bacharach & Lawler 1981). 
What we have termed "total power," Emerson (1972) has called an indicator of 
"cohesion." The idea of cohesion does tend to grasp the import of mutual dependence—greater 
mutual dependence (i.e., total power on the dependence dimension) should increase the 
conciliatory behavior in the relationship. Furthermore, Bacharach and Lawler (1981) have shown 
that higher levels of total power on the dependence dimension produce softer concession tactics 
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by actors in dyadic bargaining or "cohesion effects" in Emerson's terms. The problem is that it is 
not clear whether total power on the punitive dimension operates in the same way as total power 
on the dependence dimension. Some research implies that greater (mutual) punitive capability 
increases punitive action (Deutsch 1973), while other work has suggested that greater levels of 
such capability decrease punitive action (Bacharach & Lawler 1981; Lawler, Ford & Ble- gen 
1986). The former have been termed "conflict spiral" effects and the latter have been called 
"deterrence," and theories of both bilateral (mutual) deterrence and conflict spiral have been 
developed to deal with these opposing effects of punitive capability on the use of power 
(Bacharach & Lawler 1981; Lawler 1986). This research will use the deterrence formulation to 
compare the effects of dependence and punitive based power on tactical action in a bargaining 
context. 
The second class of problems with previous work on power are matters of emphasis. We 
have three specific criticisms: (1) micro work on tactical action has emphasized the question of 
how effective particular tactics are at influencing another actor (see reviews in Pruitt 1981; 
Rubin & Brown 1975; Tedeschi, Schlenker & Bonoma 1973) and neglected the question of how 
the power relationship affects the choice of tactic (see Bacharach & Lawler 1981; Kipnis 1974; 
Lawler & Bacharach 1976; Molm 1985 for exceptions); (2) in work that links power to tactics, 
the emphasis is on power dependence OR punitive capabilities and threat/damage tactics OR 
concession/reward tactics. Research on concession tactics seldom incorporates threat and 
damage tactics, and research on damage tactics seldom incorporates concession tactics (e.g., 
Pruitt 1981); (3) and related, the form of tactic appears to dictate the form of power (or vice 
versa). If the focus is on threats, then the punitive or coercive capability is the form of power of 
interest; if concession behavior is the focus, then dependence is the form of power included in 
Comparison of Dependence        7 
 
the theoretical and empirical analysis. The implicit and untested hypothesis implied in the limited 
emphases of prior work is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The dependence form of power will affect concession, but not 
damage, tactics of actors; while, punitive capability will affect damage, but not 
concession, tactics. 
 
This is the initial hypothesis around which the bilateral deterrence ones will be organized. 
Assuming the above "match" between forms of power and types of tactics, the deterrence 
formulation will suggest similar effects for dependence and punitive power on concession and 
damage tactics, respectively. 
 
Bilateral Deterrence Hypotheses 
 
The deterrence formulation makes predictions for "total power" consistent with 
Emerson's cohesion notion. The primary deterrence proposition is that greater levels of total 
power lead to lower rates of power usage across actors in the relationship (Bacharach & Lawler 
1981; Lawler 1986). The rationale for this is that an actor's rate of using power is a function of 
(a) the actor's fear of retaliation (Bacharach & Lawler 1981) and (b) the expectation of attack 
from the opponent (Lawler 1986; Schelling 1960). The opponent's capability has a positive 
impact on the fear of retaliation and the actor's own capability has a negative impact on the 
expectation of attack by the opponent (see Lawler 1986 for a more extensive explanation). Thus, 
given a constant degree of power difference, the higher the power of each actor in the 
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relationship, the greater each actor's fear of retaliation if he or she uses power and the lower their 
expectation that die other will initiate power use. Higher fear of retaliation combined with lower 
expectations of power use by the opponent will, in turn, lead each actor to use power less often. 
Applying the deterrence formulation to dependence-based as well as punitive-based power (in 
the context of Hypothesis 1) this study will test two "total power" hypotheses:2 
 
Hypothesis 2: With relative power held constant, higher levels of total (i.e., 
mutual) dependence will lead to higher levels of concession magnitude, that is, 
softer concession tactics (across actors). 
 
Hypothesis 3: With relative power (i.e., power difference) held constant, higher 
levels of total punitive capability will lead to lower rates of using threat and 
damage tactics (across actors). 
 
It should be noted that while the deterrence formulation is clearly designed for punitive 
power, it raises the question of whether dependence will affect punitive tactics in the same way 
as punitive capability. Similarly, punitive power could affect concession behavior in the same 
way as dependence. To the degree that such common effects do not occur, the distinction 
between dependence and punitive forms of power is important empirically. 
Bilateral deterrence theory also contains propositions on the effects of equal vs. unequal 
power. Once again, these were designed for understanding the punitive form of power (see 
Bacharach & Lawler 1981) but can be extended to differences with regard to power dependence. 
The theory stipulates that unequal power will undermine the processes that create and maintain 
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deterrence, thereby, increasing power use by both the higher- and lower-power actor. The high-
power actor will be more inclined to exploit power because the only real obstacle to this—
retaliation—appears less likely given B's lower power. In other words, power use by the 
advantaged actor will be a function primarily of that actor's own fear of retaliation. However, the 
low-power actor will also be more likely to use power. While the low-power actor's fear of 
retaliation is greater, that actor will use punitive tactics in order to demonstrate that he or she 
cannot be intimidated or to communicate to the opponent that an attack will involve some 
retaliation costs. That is, power use by the disadvantaged actor will be a function primarily of 
that actor's expectation of attack. Under unequal power, the low- and high-power actor are 
assumed to accord different weight to the fear of retaliation and expectation of attack, and, thus, 
the following hypotheses are suggested: 
Hypothesis 4: With total power constant, unequal dependence will engender lower levels of 
concession magnitude (across actors) than equal dependence. 
 
Hypothesis 5: With total power constant, unequal punitive capability will produce 
higher rates of threat and damage tactics (across actors) than equal punitive 
capability. 
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Method 
 
Design and Subjects 
 
A 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design manipulated total dependence (low vs. high), relative 
dependence (equal vs. unequal), total punitive capability (low vs. high), and relative punitive 
capability (equal vs. unequal). One hundred and twenty-eight dyads (same-sex) were randomly 
assigned to one of the 16 experimental conditions (8 dyads per cell—4 female and 4 male). 
Dyads consisted of "real" subjects who actually bargained with each other, and there was no 
deception in the study. 
 
Procedures 
 
Subjects were scheduled in groups of 6 to 10. After they arrived, the experimenter 
assigned subjects to one of two rooms. Subjects took a seat in separate cubicles within one of 
these rooms and read written instructions. The instructions indicated that to maintain anonymity, 
they would be paired at random with one of the persons in the other room. One of them would 
represent a group called Alpha, while the other would represent a group termed Beta. 
The experimental situation was essentially "context free," meaning that we did not 
provide concrete roles, for example, as labor negotiators, representatives of a nation, etc. In 
addition, the "issue" being negotiated was an abstract continuum with 29 agreement levels 
identified by whole numbers between 1 and 29, rather than the price of product, wage rates, or 
the like. Context-free procedures were designed to minimize the degree that subjects would act 
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in terms of some stereotypical image they have of particular issues or particular bargaining 
settings. 
The instructions indicated that the two groups—Alpha and Beta— had engaged in 
preliminary discussions and that Alpha had made an offer of "1" and Beta had made an offer of 
"29" in these discussions. The task of the subject was to negotiate in their group's interest and, 
specifically, maximize their own gain regardless of what the opponent received. They understood 
that their pay for the experiment was contingent on the agreement level arrived at in the 
negotiations, and instructions contained a profit list which identified the actor's own profit at 
each of the 29 agreements levels. Alpha received greater profit the higher the agreement level, 
and Beta received greater profit the lower the agreement level. The profit list showed a linear 
progression in profit (points) from one end of the continuum to the other ("1" for Beta, "29" for 
Alpha). Subjects were unaware of the opponent's profit at each agreement level and points rather 
than real money were the payoff units on the profit list, based on the assumption that bargainers 
seldom have complete information even on their own profits. The instructions informed subjects 
that the experimenter would use a chart to transform the points into money at the end of the 
experiment. 
Subjects learned from the instructions that the bargaining would take place through 
written offers and messages across a series of rounds. On each round, bargainers would send one 
written offer (i.e., a number between 1 and 29) and have the opportunity to send either a warning 
or fine message by circling a "W" (for warning) or "F" (for a fine). Consider the offers first. 
Alpha was chosen by chance to send the first offer. When making an offer, the bargainer had 
three options: (a) stick with and repeat their last offer, (b) accept the last offer of the opponent, or 
(c) make a concession. The only restriction was that bargainers could not retract earlier 
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concessions. Turning to the warning/fine options, on each round the bargainer had the option to 
send a warning or fine (not both) by circling a "W" or "F" next to the offer line for that round. A 
warning was a threat to use a fine in the future if the other does not make more concessions in 
the bargaining; a fine message reduced the point outcomes of the opponent. No more than 5 fines 
could be used in the bargaining and each of the fines reduced the other's outcome by a fixed 
percent set by the experimental manipulation (discussed below). 
The bargaining continued until an agreement was reached or until the end of the 15th 
round. If no agreement was reached, actors received no points from the bargaining but were able 
to reach an agreement with a hypothetical other. This was termed the "chance alternative" and it 
involved a drawing to determine the agreement level which the subjects would get from an 
alternative opponent and on which they would be paid. The chance alternative was used to 
manipulate dependence as the probability of getting a good agreement from another 
(hypothetical in this case) actor. 
 
Experimental Manipulations 
 
The maximum percent reduction in the other's outcomes served as the manipulation of 
each actor's punitive capability, while the probability of getting a good agreement from the 
hypothetical alternative actor manipulated the dependence relationship. For both punitive 
capability and dependence, the total power (low vs. high) and relative power (equal vs. unequal) 
were manipulated as follows: 
 
Punitive Capability 
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Each dyad was assigned to one of four punitive capability conditions: 25%- 25% (equal 
with low total power); 75%-75% (equal with high total power); 40%-10% (unequal with low 
total power); or 90%-60% (unequal with high total power). Notice that the total power (sum of 
each actor's power) is constant across the equal and unequal power conditions and also that the 
power difference is constant across conditions of total power. This is designed to avoid the 
confounding of relative and total power often found in previous work. 
 
Dependence 
 
Each dyad was also simultaneously assigned to one of four conditions of dependence, 
operationalized as the probability of getting a favorable agreement from the "change alternative"; 
that is, an agreement within a favorable range on the issue continuum from another actor. The 
probability conditions utilized the same numbers as those used to manipulate punitive capability: 
75%-75% (equal with low total power); 25%-25% (equal with high total power); 90%-60% 
(unequal with low total power); or 40%- 10% (unequal with high total power). The confounding 
of relative and total power is avoided in a similar manner here. 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
There are three primary dependent variables: the frequency of fine behavior (damage 
tactics) across both actors, the frequency of warnings (i.e., threat tactics) and the magnitude of 
concessions made throughout the bargaining. Given that the number of rounds can vary across 
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dyads, the fine and warning behavior will be treated as a proportion per round. Concession 
magnitude will be measured as the amount of difference between the endpoint of the issue 
continuum (1 for Beta, 29 for Alpha) and the final offers of each bargainer. All variables are 
dealt with at the dyad level, but the analysis is conducted using role (Alpha vs. Beta) as a within-
sub- jects factor to control for role and determine whether role effects qualify the major findings 
of the research. 
 
Results 
 
The results will focus on three forms of tactical action available to actors in the 
experiment: fine behavior, warning behavior, and concession behavior. 
 
Fine Behavior 
 
Table 1 contains means for the fines as a proportion per round and the absolute 
frequencies of fines (in parentheses) by experimental condition. An analysis of variance on the 
proportion scores3 with subject (Alpha vs. Beta) as a within subjects factor revealed main effects 
for three of the manipulated variables: relative dependence, 𝐹𝐹(𝑙𝑙, 112) = 5.24,𝑝𝑝 < .02; relative 
punitive capability, 𝐹𝐹(𝑙𝑙, 112) = 22.56, 𝑝𝑝 < .001; and total punitive capability, 𝐹𝐹(𝑙𝑙, 112) =5.87,𝑝𝑝 < .02. With regard to total power, the results are consistent with the bilateral deterrence 
hypotheses on punitive power but not with the extension to dependence. Greater total punitive 
capability reduced the frequency of damage tactics in the relationship, but the impact of total 
dependence on fine use was not statistically significant (F<1). With regard to relative power 
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(equal vs. unequal), the results for both punitive capability and dependence are consistent with 
bilateral-deterrence notions. Damage tactics (fines) were more frequent under conditions of 
unequal, compared to equal, punitive power and unequal, compared to equal dependence. 
Bilateral-deterrence theory predicts that in an unequal-power relationship both lower- and 
higher-power actors will use power more, that is, each should use fines more than they would in 
an equal-power relationship. To assess this, the mean fine use for low- and high-power actors in 
unequal dyads was computed and compared with each other and with actors in equal-power 
relationships. For punitive power, low- and high- power actors had nearly identical rates of fine 
use (𝑀𝑀′𝑠𝑠 = 3.16 and 3.20 respectively, 𝑓𝑓 < 1) and these rates were larger than those of actors in 
an equal relationship (𝑀𝑀′𝑠𝑠 =  1.63 and 1.72 for the two actors). In the case of dependence, the 
same pattern of results occurred—lower- and higher- power actors had comparable rates of fine 
use (𝑀𝑀′𝑠𝑠 = 2.70 and 2.78, respectively, 𝑓𝑓 < 1) which were, in turn, higher than actors in an 
equal-power relationship (𝑀𝑀′𝑠𝑠 = 2.09 and 2.12). These results support bilateral deterrence. 
Furthermore, it is clear that the impact of differences in punitive capability and dependence 
cannot be attributed to different rates of power use by the low- vs. high-power actors in the 
unequal-power relationship. 
 
 
Insert Table 1 Here 
 
 
The only significant interaction is a three-way effect between relative dependence, total 
dependence, and relative punitive capability, 𝐹𝐹(1,112) = 6.18,𝑝𝑝 < .01. Tuke/s HSD indicates 
that none of the differences reach statistical significance, (at the . 05 level) and the pattern of the 
interaction does not suggest any major qualifications of the foregoing main effects. Overall, the 
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results for punitive capability consistently support the deterrence formulation, while those for 
dependence offer partial support for the extension of deterrence principles to the dependence 
form of power. 
 
Warning Behavior 
 
Table 2 contains the mean threats per round as well as the absolute frequency of threats 
by experimental condition. A five-way analysis of variance identical to that for fine behavior 
revealed only two marginally significant results: a weak main effect for relative dependence, 
𝐹𝐹(𝑙𝑙, 112)  =  2.76,𝑝𝑝 < .10, and a marginal interaction effect between relative dependence and 
relative punitive capability, 𝐹𝐹(𝑙𝑙, 112) = 3.61,𝑝𝑝 < .06. The main effect reveals a trend in support 
of deterrence theory (i.e., more threats in the unequal than equal condition) but this is qualified 
by the marginal two-way interaction. The two-way interaction shows a clear pattern indicating 
that threat usage was lowest when actors were equal on both dependence and punitive capability 
(𝑀𝑀 =  .17 vs. . 26 for each of the other three conditions). However, the major implication of the 
results is that threat tactics do not respond to the same processes or conditions as damage tactics. 
This is consistent with some research in the trucking-game tradition and more recent research as 
well (Bacharach & Lawler 1981; Lawler, Ford & Blegen 1986). 
 
Concession Behavior 
 
Table 3 contains the data on concession magnitude, number of rounds, and proportion of 
agreements by experimental condition. For the most critical measure, concession magnitude, the 
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five-way analysis of variance revealed (a) a main effect for total dependence, 𝐹𝐹(𝑙𝑙, 112) =5.30,𝑝𝑝 < .02, (b) a main effect for relative punitive capability, 𝐹𝐹(𝑙𝑙, 112)  =  11.13,𝑝𝑝 < .001, 
and (c) a three-way interaction (relative dependence × total dependence × relative punitive 
capability), 𝐹𝐹(𝑙𝑙, 112) = 6.44,𝑝𝑝 < .01. The two main effects support deterrence predictions—
greater conciliation (i.e., concession magnitude across actors) with high total dependence than 
low total dependence, and also greater conciliation with equal than with unequal punitive 
capability. The pattern of the three-way interaction is that the greatest level of concession 
magnitude occurred when bargainers were equal on both dependence and punitive dimensions 
while also having high total dependence. 
 
 
Insert Table 2 Here 
 
 
Turning to the number of rounds and rate of agreement, few significant effects emerge. 
Analysis of variance reveals only one significant effect for the number of rounds, a four-way 
interaction that just makes the . 05 level, 𝐹𝐹(𝑙𝑙, 112) = 4.08,𝑝𝑝 < .05. The pattern implies that the 
fewest rounds occurred when bargainers had equal power on both dependence and punitive 
dimensions, high total (i.e., mutual) dependence, and low total power on the punitive dimension. 
Turning to the data on whether agreement occurred, the same pattern is observed—conflict 
resolution was most likely under conditions of equal power on both dependence and punitive 
capability combined with high mutual (total) dependence. A log- linear analysis of the agreement 
data indicates that this three-way interaction reaches statistical significance (𝑋𝑋2(1)  =  5.21,𝑝𝑝 <.05). The only other significant effect is a total dependence main effect showing higher rates of 
agreement under high as opposed to low, mutual dependence, 𝑋𝑋2(1) =  4.55,𝑝𝑝 < .05. 
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Given the problem of replicating complex interactions, it is dangerous to attribute 
importance to three- or four-way interactions that are not clearly derived from a theory. 
However, the interactions reported in this section cohere in a noteworthy way. Given the 
particular combination of conditions that recur in these interactions (i.e., equal power with regard 
to both forms of power plus high mutual dependence), the data offer corroboration to some of the 
general ideas underlying the bilateral-deterrence formulation (Bacharach & Lawler 1981; Lawler 
1986)—equal power conditions and higher levels of mutual power capability tend to generate 
less conflictual (or more conciliatory) behavior. 
 
 
Insert Table 3 Here 
 
 
Gender and Role Analyses 
 
There are few gender or role effects by power on the three major dependent variables, 
and those that occur tend to be weak. A main effect for gender on warnings indicates a tendency 
for females to use more threats than males, 𝐹𝐹(𝑙𝑙, 112) = 5.30,𝑝𝑝 < .05; a three-way interaction 
(total dependence × total punitive capability × gender) suggests that under high total (mutual) 
power on both dependence and punitive power females were less likely than males to use fines, 
𝐹𝐹 = 4.49,𝑝𝑝 < .05; the one and only role (Alpha vs. Beta) by power effect from all the analyses 
is a complex fourway interaction (relative dependence × total dependence × total punitive 
capability × role) for warnings, 𝐹𝐹 = 4.80,𝑝𝑝 < .05. The replicability and interprabability of these 
effects is questionable. The key point is that they do not significantly qualify the major results. 
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Discussion 
 
The research has two general implications. First, the theoretical distinctions made in the 
introduction—dependence vs. punitive capability and relative vs. total power—have important 
empirical consequences. These forms or dimensions of power show somewhat divergent effects 
on two classes of bargaining behavior: concession and damage tactics. Second, the significant 
results found in the study support bilateral-deterrence theory. The support for bilateral deterrence 
applies to the propositions on both "total power" and relative power (i.e., power differences) on 
the punitive dimension, and, with some qualification, it extends to the dependence dimension. 
These implications are elaborated below. 
The broadest (and also most tenuous) hypothesis of the study was that the dependence 
form of power would determine concession behavior while the punitive form of power would 
determine punitive behavior. This hypothesis was treated as implicit in the exclusive focus of 
prior literature on either dependence/concession behavior or punitive capability/threats, that is, 
the tactic of primary concern leads to a consideration of one form of power but not the other 
(e.g., Bacharach & Lawler 1981; Komorita 1977; Pruitt 1981; Rubin & Brown 1975). Consider 
the differential causes of concessions and damage tactics in light of this hypothesis. Concession 
behavior is a function of total power on the dependence dimension as well as relative power 
(equal vs. unequal) on the punitive dimension; whereas, damage tactics are a function of relative 
and total power on the punitive dimension as well as relative power on the dependence 
dimension. The initial hypothesis on the exclusive effects of dependence vs. punitive capability 
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is not supported. The question, however, is how do we make sense of the different patterns for 
dependence and punitive capability? 
The answer appears to lie in the distinction between relative and total power. There is 
actually complete support for the initial hypothesis in the case of the total power dimensions: 
total power on the dependence dimension (i.e., mutual dependence) affects concession behavior 
but not punitive behavior; and, similarly, total power on the punitive dimension (i.e., mutual 
punitive capability) affects punitive behavior (i.e., damage tactics) but not concession behavior. 
The negative evidence on the hypothesis is due to the fact that a power difference on the 
dependence dimension affects punitive behavior, while a power difference on the punitive 
dimension affects concession behavior. The implication is that if there is unequal power on either 
dimension of power (dependence or punitive capability), the low- and high-power actors will be 
motivated to use that differential capability in both decisions on concession and punitive tactics. 
In any case, the different effects of power dependence and punitive power document the 
empirical importance of this distinction. 
 Virtually all of the results can be understood in the context of the bilateral deterrence 
formulation of Bacharach and Lawler (1981) and Lawler (1986). The support is strongest with 
regard to the effects of punitive capability. As predicted, greater total power (i.e., punitive 
capability) in the relationship decreases the use of damage tactics, while unequal power produces 
higher rates of such action. The explanation offered by the theory is that an increase in total 
power will enhance each actor's fear of the other's retaliation while also reducing the expectation 
of attack from the other. For a given actor, it is the other's punitive capability that creates the fear 
of retaliation and one's own punitive capability that underlies the degree that the actor expects 
the other to engage in damaging action (Bacharach & Lawler 1981; Lawler 1986). 
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The effects of relative power also offer substantial support to the reformulated theory 
(Lawler 1986), which argues that unequal power will actually increase each actor's use of 
damage tactics. Higher-power actors will fear retaliation less and be more inclined to use the 
power capability, while the lower-power actors, expecting such action by the higher-power 
person, will be more inclined to use damage tactics as a means of communicating resolve and a 
desire to avoid being intimidated (Lawler 1986). While these effects on both actors' use of 
damage tactics are based on "idealized" conditions (e.g., bilateral power), the critical point of the 
theory is that unequal power will not simply increase tire higher-power actor's use of power and 
reduce the lower-power's use to a proportional degree, a notion very often found in the literature 
on power and tactics (Rubin & Brown 1975). The result of such counterbalanced effects would 
be no effect on the overall rate of damage tactics in the relationship. Bilateral deterrence theory 
clearly rejects this view, and so do the results from this experiment. 
Finally, it appears that principles from bilateral deterrence theory can be extended to 
dependence-based power. Total dependence has a positive impact on concession magnitude 
across actors, and unequal dependence reveals a deterrence effect on the use of damage tactics. 
The results for dependence are not as consistent as those for punitive capability simply because 
while all of the effects that do occur are in support of deterrence theory, some of the predicted 
effects (e.g., effect of relative dependence on concession magnitude) do not occur. Nevertheless, 
it is clear that deterrence theory, though designed primarily for the analysis of punitive 
capabilities, contains principles that apply to dependence-based power. Furthermore, while this 
study suggests that the theory of bilateral deterrence may have broader applicability than 
originally intended, it suggests that power-dependence theory may not be as general a framework 
as originally intended. At minimum, this paper demonstrates the need for power dependence 
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theory to come to grips with punitive forms of power and suggests that the theory of bilateral 
deterrence offers a promising approach for linking power capability and power use. 
To conclude, this paper argues that work on power has overlooked some theoretically and 
empirically important distinctions—dependence vs. punitive power and relative vs. total power. 
The contrast of dependence and punitive power is essentially a contrast of opportunity and 
retaliation costs (see also Bacharach & Lawler 1981). The distinction between relative and total 
power is essentially a distinction between the distributive and integrative faces of power (see 
Lawler & Bacharach 1986). This paper adopted a tactical approach to conflict and showed that 
these disparate dimensions or forms of power have different effects on tactical action in 
bargaining (e.g., concession and damage tactics). The effects are consistent with the predictions 
drawn from the theory of bilateral deterrence. 
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Notes 
 
1. Total power is the foundation for what Emerson (1972) terms, “cohesion,” and it 
introduces a non-zero sum feature into a power analysis (see Bacharach & Lawler 1981, 
pp. 65- 68), which power-dependence theorists have generally failed to develop or 
capitalize on (see Molm 1985 for an exception). Although total power is constant or fixed 
in a specific relationship at a given point in time, it varies across relationships and can 
increase or decrease over time within the same relationship. (For a theoretical analysis of 
patterns over time, see Lawler & Bacharach 1986.) 
2. A more detailed and explicit presentation of the assumptions and scope conditions of the 
theory can be found in Lawler (1986). 
3. Results for the absolute frequency of fines are virtually identical to those for the 
proportion of rounds on which fines occurred. Also, the analysis of the proportions was 
rerun using arcsine-transformed scores, and the results were identical. 
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